of the surface of the globe during several successive geological periods . .
. the parallelism between the order of succession of animals and plants in
geological times, and the gradation among their living representatives . .
. the parallelism between the order of succession of animals in geological
times and the changes their living representatives undergo during their
embryological growth, [I-5] . . . the combination in many extinct types of
characters which in later ages appear disconnected in different types, . .
. the parallelism between the gradation among animals and the changes they
undergo during their growth, . . . the relations existing between these
different series and the geographical distribution of animals, . . . the
connection of all the known features of Nature into one system--"


In a word, the whole relations of animals, etc., to surrounding Nature and
to each other, are regarded under the one view as ultimate facts, or in the
ultimate aspect, and interpreted theologically; under the other as complex
facts, to be analyzed and interpreted scientifically. The one naturalist,
perhaps too largely assuming the scientifically unexplained to be
inexplicable, views the phenomena only in their supposed relation to the
Divine mind. The other, naturally expecting many of these phenomena to be
resolvable under investigation, views them in their relations to one
another, and endeavors to explain them as far as he can (and perhaps
farther) through natural causes.

But does the one really exclude the other? Does the investigation of
physical causes stand opposed to the theological view and the study of the
harmonies between mind and Nature? More than this, is it not most
presumable that an intellectual conception realized in Nature would be
realized through natural agencies? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions
affirmatively when he declares that "the task of science is to investigate