extent does this morbid fear of trusting too much to any mortal go
in some men, that in their practical belief you would think that
the fact of any man being very wise was a reason why his judgment
should be set aside as unworthy of consideration; and more particularly,
that the fact of any man being supposed to be a powerful reasoner,
was quite enough to show that all he says is to go for nothing? You
are quite aware how jauntily some people use this last consideration,
to sweep away at once all the reasons given by an able and ingenious
speaker or writer. And it cuts the ground effectually from under
his feet. You state an opinion, somewhat opposed to that commonly
received. An honest, stupid person meets it with a surprised stare.
You tell him (I am recording what I have myself witnessed) that
you have been reading a work on the subject by a certain prelate:
you state as well as you can the arguments which are set forth by
the distinguished prelate. These arguments seem of great weight.
They deserve at least to be carefully considered. They seem to
prove the novel opinion to be just: they assuredly call on candid
minds to ponder the whole matter well before relapsing into the
old current way of thinking. Do you expect that the honest, stupid
person will judge thus? If so, you are mistaken. He is not shaken
in the least by all these strong reasons. The man who has set
these reasons forth is known to be a master of logic: that is good
ground why all his reasons should count for nothing. Oh, says the
stupid, honest person, we all know that the Archbishop can prove
anything! And so the whole thing is finally settled.

I have a considerable list of instances in which the reaction from
an error on one side of the line of right, lands in error equally
distant from the line of right on the other side: but it is needless
to go on to illustrate these at length; the mere mention of them