Municipal Corporations Act; seeing that one of the principal defects
which that Act was intended to remedy was the practical exclusion of
the principle of popular election from the government of the borough,
and the accumulation of power in the hands of a small body of persons.
The commissioners state, in their general report of 1835:--'The most
common and most striking defect in the constitution of the municipal
corporations of England and Wales is, that the corporate bodies exist
independently of the communities among which they are found. The
corporations look upon themselves, and are considered by the
inhabitants, as separate and exclusive bodies; they have powers and
privileges within towns and cities from which they are named, but in
most places all identity of interest between the corporation and the
inhabitants has disappeared.' From the defect described in this
passage, the Corporation of London has for many years been exempt.
The manner in which the Common Council is elected has produced, to a
great extent, an identity of interests between the governing municipal
body and the existing municipal community, and has secured to the
latter a council representing their general opinions and feelings.
The Municipal Commissioners particularly advert to the Common Council
of London, as distinguishing that corporation from the close
corporations which then prevailed throughout the country."

It is difficult to imagine a better reason for upholding the existing
order of things than this very report of the commissioners. They admit
that there is an identity of interests between the governing and the
governed, between the representatives and their constituents, between
the stewards and those for whom they act. No higher commendation can
be desired. The system is described as giving satisfaction to all
concerned in its operation, and as being free from the great defect
which vitiated the municipal arrangements of other cities. The