events and successes. This error is in the highest degree pernicious:
not because it is an error,--for there are illusions which are both
salutary and blessed,--but because it threatens to convert our victory
into a signal defeat. A defeat? --I should say rather, into the
uprooting of the "German Mind" for the benefit of the "German Empire."

Even supposing that the fight had been between the two cultures, the
standard for the value of the victor would still be a very relative
one, and, in any case, would certainly not justify such exaggerated
triumph or self-glorification. For, in the first place, it would be
necessary to ascertain the worth of the conquered culture. This might
be very little; in which case, even if the victory had involved the
most glorious display of arms, it would still offer no warrant for
inordinate rapture.

Even so, however, there can be no question, in our case, of the
victory of German culture; and for the simple reason, that French
culture remains as heretofore, and that we depend upon it as
heretofore. It did not even help towards the success of our arms.
Severe military discipline, natural bravery and sustaining power, the
superior generalship, unity and obedience in the rank and file--in
short, factors which have nothing to do with culture, were
instrumental in making us conquer an opponent in whom the most
essential of these factors were absent. The only wonder is, that
precisely what is now called "culture" in Germany did not prove an
obstacle to the military operations which seemed vitally necessary to
a great victory. Perhaps, though, this was only owing to the fact that
this "thing" which dubs itself "culture" saw its advantage, for once,
in keeping in the background.