administration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the
men composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which
influences or controls them. But all the difference between a good and
a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for
bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in the community
to bear upon the administration of justice, and making it duly
operative on the result. The arrangements for rendering the choice of
the judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and
intelligence; the salutary forms of procedure; the publicity which
allows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of
discussion and cinsure through the press; the mode of taking evidence,
according as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the
facilities, whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the
tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending
offenders-all these things are not the power, but the machinery for
bringing the power into contact with the obstacle; and the machinery
has no action of itself, but without it the power, let it be ever so
ample, would be wasted and of no effect. A similar distinction exists
in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of
administration. Their machinery is good, when the proper tests are
prescribed for the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for
their promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among
those who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical order
established for its transaction, a correct and intelligible record
kept of it after being transacted; when each individual knows for what
he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when
the best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favoritism,
or jobbery in any of the acts of the department. But political checks
will no more act of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse
without a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as