obedience and "right divine" would long ward off the natural
consequences of such a position. The monarch would have to succumb,
and conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty, or give place
to some one who would. The despotism, being thus chiefly nominal,
would possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute
monarchy, while it would realize in a very imperfect degree those of a
free government, since, however great an amount of liberty the
citizens might practically enjoy, they could never forget that they
held it on sufferance, and by a concession which, under the existing
constitution of the state might at any moment be resumed; that they
were legally slaves, though of a prudent or indulgent master.

It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed
reformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary
public improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the
untractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt
combinations of selfish private interests, armed with the powerful
weapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a
strong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a
recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact
that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are
ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such
direction for the realization of their hopes leave out of the idea of
good government its principal element, the improvement of the people
themselves. One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler
can not pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for them
without amending _them_. If it were possible for the people to be well
governed in spite of themselves, their good government would last no
longer than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been
liberated by foreign arms without their own co-operation. It is true,