(though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative
institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest
stages of any community, not excepting a city community like those of
ancient Greece; where, accordingly, the government of kings, under
some real, but no ostensible or constitutional control by public
opinion, did historically precede by an unknown and probably great
duration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a
considerable lapse of time, to oligarchies of a few families.

A hundred other infirmities or shortcomings in a people might be
pointed out which _pro tanto_ disqualify them from making the best use
of representative government; but in regard to these it is not equally
obvious that the government of One or a Few would have any tendency to
cure or alleviate the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate
adherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or
mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in
a people, will be in general faithfully reflected in their
representative assemblies; and should it happen that the executive
administration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the
hands of persons comparatively free from these defects, more good
would frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of
carrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies. But the mere
position of the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other
cases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and
tendencies operating in the beneficial direction. From the general
weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilization, the One and
his councillors, or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt;
except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior
people or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers
may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization to those over