The Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant
page 55 of 213 (25%)
page 55 of 213 (25%)
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end is always empirical and, therefore, may serve for the Epicurean
principle of the happiness theory, but not for the pure rational principle of morality and duty. Thus, talents and the improvement of them, because they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will of God, if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will, without any antecedent independent practical principle, can be motives only by reason of the happiness expected therefrom. Hence it follows, first, that all the principles here stated are material; secondly, that they include all possible material principles; and, finally, the conclusion, that since material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law (as has been shown), the formal practical principle the pure reason (according to which the mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and immediate determining principle of the will) is the only one possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives, that is, practical laws (which make actions a duty), and in general to serve as the principle of morality, both in criticizing conduct and also in its application to the human will to determine it. I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure Practical Reason. {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 ^paragraph 125} This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of itself determine the will independently of anything |
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