(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign
how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is
also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to
make exceptions from the maxim of the actions, but only the permission
to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general love of
our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the
field for the practice of virtue. The more indeterminate the duty, and
the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the
action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of
obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice),
so much the more perfect is his virtuous action.

Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The
fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression
is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth
= o, unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those
duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly
called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is
not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want
of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived
from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology
signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called
transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become
a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium).

Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an
upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim
of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice
is meritorious. For by this the man makes the right of humanity or
of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond