INTRODUCTION.


It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861-65,
that enough has already been written upon the campaign of Chancellorsville.
And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the histories now before the
public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less accurate of this ten-days'
passage of arms. But none of these spread before the reader facts
sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular theory advanced by
each to account for the defeat of the Army of the Potomac on this field.

The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of
Howard, its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a small
degree owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for his
failure to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkable
blunders into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoring
to explain away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact,
indeed, that the Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, with
one-half its force; and the very partial publication, thus far, of the
details of the campaign, and the causes of our defeat,--may stand as
excuse for one more attempt to make plain its operations to the
survivors of the one hundred and eighty thousand men who there bore arms,
and to the few who harbor some interest in the subject as mere history.

To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in
this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memory
of a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done his
country signal service; and to avoid the imputation of baldly throwing
down the gauntlet of ungracious criticism. All reference to Gen. Hooker's