from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick's crossing.

There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness,
in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all places in
that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general
commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards
Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings,
woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms.

Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier
communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy,
and advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from
imperative reasons alone.

Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"--the forces on the turnpike and
plank road--"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the
column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be
advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged
from the forest at that moment" (this is a very imperfect statement of
the facts); "but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow,
I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to
resist the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in
detail." And in another place, "When I marched out on the morning of
the 1st of May I could get but few troops into position: the column had
to march through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast
enough to prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance.
On assuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon
repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground.
It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlike