Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.


4.1211 Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occurs in its
sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is
mentioned in both of them. If two propositions contradict one another, then
their structure shows it; the same is true if one of them follows from the
other. And so on.


4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.


4.1213 Now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a sign-
language in which everything is all right, we already have a correct
logical point of view.


4.122 In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and
states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties:
and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations.
(Instead of 'structural property' I also say 'internal property'; instead
of 'structural relation', 'internal relation'. I introduce these
expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very
widespread among philosophers.) It is impossible, however, to assert by
means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain:
rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the
relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.