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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein
page 54 of 101 (53%)

5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.


5.1362 The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing
actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality
were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.--The connexion
between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity. ('A knows
that p is the case', has no sense if p is a tautology.)


5.1363 If the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it
is self-evident to us, then its self-evidence in no way justifies our
belief in its truth.


5.14 If one proposition follows from another, then the latter says more
than the former, and the former less than the latter.


5.141 If p follows from q and q from p, then they are one and same
proposition.


5.142 A tautology follows from all propositions: it says nothing.


5.143 Contradiction is that common factor of propositions which no
proposition has in common with another. Tautology is the common factor of
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