Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein
page 76 of 101 (75%)
page 76 of 101 (75%)
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that something or other is the state of things, but that something is :
that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience-- that something is so . It is prior to the question 'How?' not prior to the question 'What?' 5.5521 And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put it in this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world, how then could there be a logic given that there is a world? 5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (individuals). But between what numbers? And how is this supposed to be decided?--By experience? (There is no pre-eminent number.) 5.554 It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form. 5.5541 It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the question whether I can get into a position in which I need the sign for a 27-termed relation in order to signify something. 5.5542 But is it really legitimate even to ask such a question? Can we set up a form of sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to it? Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can be the case? |
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