Prudence may be illustrated by the case of the camel who fills himself
with water enough to last for many desert days, or that of the bird
who builds her nest with remarkable ingenuity and pains out of the
reach of invaders. Whether or not we shall attribute self-control to
the lower animals is a mere matter of definition; in the looser sense
we may credit with it the hungry fox who does not touch the bait whose
dangerous nature he vaguely suspects. Temperance is probably one of
the latest of the virtues, and is rather conspicuously absent in much
of human history and biography; but perhaps students of animal psychology
can guarantee instances to which the name might fairly be given.

In lesser degree, then, but unmistakably present, we find the same
sort of conduct appearing in the animals to which we give in man the
names courage, prudence, etc. Purely instinctive these acts usually
are though we may see even in the animals the beginnings of mental
conflicts, of reasoning, of reflection. But morality (if we keep to
the wider sense of the term) is none the less morality when it is
instinctive and natural. Morality is a general name for certain KINDS
of conduct, certain redirections of impulse. These redirections
appeared in animal life long before the emergence of what we may call
man from his ape-like ancestry; and all of our self-conscious moral
idealism is but a continuation and development of the process then
begun. Any theory of right and wrong must take account of the fact
that morality, unlike art, science, and religion, is not an exclusively
human affair. In contrast with these late and purely human innovations,
it is hoary with antiquity and the possession, in some rudimentary
form or other, of nearly the whole realm of organic life.

What were the main causes that produced personal morality?