that suspicion is well founded, we must condemn the traitor. But
certainly, if a man experiences a sincere change of conviction, he
should not be required to continue to serve the side that he now feels
to be in the wrong; every man must be free to follow his conscience,
even if it leads him to disavow his own earlier allegiance. Suppose
Benedict Arnold to have developed a sincere conviction that the American
revolutionists were in the wrong, and that the true welfare of both
America and Britain lay in their continued union. In such a case he
must, as a conscientious man, have transferred his allegiance to the
Tory side. So a man who has been a worker for the saloon interests,
who should become convinced of the anti-social influence of the liquor
trade, would do right to come over to the anti- saloon side and work
against his former associates. The really difficult question lies
rather here: may such a man use for the advantage of the cause he now
serves the knowledge he gained, the secrets entrusted to him, the power
he won, as a worker for the opposite cause? If Benedict Arnold was
a sincere convert to the British cause, did he do right in trying to
deliver West Point into their hands? Or are we right in execrating
him for his attempted breach of trust? May the former saloon-worker
use his inside knowledge of the saloon men's plans, and his familiarity
with the business, to help the cause to which he has transferred his
allegiance? The two cases may be closely parallel; but each will
probably be decided by most people according to the side upon which
they stand. An impartial judgment will, perhaps, condemn all breaches
of faith, all use of delegated power for ends contrary to those for
which the power was delegated, including secrets deliberately
entrusted, but will not condemn the use for the new cause of knowledge
gained by the individual's own observation, or influence won through
the power of his own personality.