depose them all, one by one. If a governor only is elected, and is
required to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his
shoulders. If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must
take the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick
enough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil.

Further, the right to choose his own subordinates makes the work of
the chief much easier, brings a unity of purpose into an administration
which is likely to be absent when a number of different men,
simultaneously elected, perhaps representing different parties, have
to work together. The increased power and responsibility of the chief
offices attract able men, men of ideals and training, who do not care
for an office whose power is limited by that of various machine
politicians who, they know, will hamper them on every side in their
efforts for efficient administration. And, apart from this
consideration, a man able enough to win election as governor is a far
better judge of the men best fitted for the various technical duties
that fall to his subordinates than is the general public. Experience
shows that the men chosen by chiefs who are elected and held
responsible to the people are generally abler than those elected to
the same positions by popular vote.

The present movement toward a short ballot, with responsibility clearly
denned and concentrated, will doubtless do away ultimately with the
clumsy systems by which both States and cities in this country are
now governed-the two-chambered legislatures, with their inevitable
friction betwixt themselves and with the executive. This method of
checks and counter-checks was thought necessary as a safeguard against
tyranny, the bugbear of our forefathers, but is now the enemy of
efficiency and the haunt of corruption. The much simpler commission