influence upon a weak or a self-willed man. And the possibility of
it allows the election of officials for longer terms, which are desirable
from several points of view: they bring a more stable government, freed
from too frequent breaks or reversals of policy; they permit the
acquiring of a longer political experience, and stimulate abler men
to run for office; they save the public the bother and expense of too
frequent elections. [Footnote: See National Municipal Review, vol.
1, p. 204. Forum, vol. 47, p. 157. North American Review, vol. 198,
p. 145.]

(4) THE REFERENDUM. A less drastic instrument of popular control
over legislation is the referendum, which refers individual measures
back to the people for approval or rejection. An official may be
efficient and free from corruption, yet opposed to the general wish
on some particular matter. In this, then, he may be overruled by the
referendum without being humiliated or required to resign his office.
Thus not only the improper influence of the machine or the interests
may be guarded against by the public, but the unconscious prejudices
of generally efficient officials. Of course there is, in the case of
both recall and referendum, the possibility that the official may be
right and the people wrong. But that danger is inherent in democratic
government. The best that can be done is to make government responsive
to the sober judgment of the majority; if that is mistaken, nothing
but time and education can correct it. [Footnote: See W. B. Munro,
The Initiative, Referendum and Recall; The Government of American Cities,
p. 321. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 415; vol. 28, p.
207. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 586. Nation, vol. 95, p.
324.]

The air is full of suggestions, and experiments are being tried in