reconnoissance had developed a strong force, and had been made
without the orders of General McDowell; however, it satisfied us
that the enemy was in force on the other side of Bull Run, and had
no intention to leave without a serious battle. We lay in camp at
Centreville all of the 19th and 20th, and during that night began
the movement which resulted in the battle of Bull Run, on July
21st. Of this so much has been written that more would be
superfluous; and the reports of the opposing commanders, McDowell
and Johnston, are fair and correct. It is now generally admitted
that it was one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one of
the worst-fought. Our men had been told so often at home that all
they had to do was to make a bold appearance, and the rebels would
run; and nearly all of us for the first time then heard the sound
of cannon and muskets in anger, and saw the bloody scenes common to
all battles, with which we were soon to be familiar. We had good
organization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, no
respect for authority, no real knowledge of war. Both armies were
fairly defeated, and, whichever had stood fast, the other would
have run. Though the North was overwhelmed with mortification and
shame, the South really had not much to boast of, for in the three
or four hours of fighting their organization was so broken up that
they did not and could not follow our army, when it was known to be
in a state of disgraceful and causeless flight. It is easy to
criticise a battle after it is over, but all now admit that none
others, equally raw in war, could have done better than we did at
Bull Run; and the lesson of that battle should not be lost on a
people like ours.

I insert my official report, as a condensed statement of my share
in the battle: