and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under Generals
Leggett and Crocker, to form a part of the Seventeenth Corps, which
corps was to be commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair, then a
member of Congress, in Washington. On the 2d of April I notified
him by letter that I wanted him to join and to command these two
divisions, which ought to be ready by the 1st of May. General
Blair, with these two divisions, constituting the Seventeenth Army
Corps, did not actually overtake us until we reached Acworth and
Big Shanty, in Georgia, about the 9th of June, 1864.

In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawains, chief of
staff to General Grant at Washington, I described at length all the
preparations that were in progress for the active campaign thus
contemplated, and therein estimated Schofield at twelve thousand,
Thomas at forty-five thousand, and McPherson at thirty thousand.
At first I intended to open the campaign about May 1st, by moving
Schofield on Dalton from Cleveland, Thomas on the same objective
from Chattanooga, and McPherson on Rome and Kingston from Gunter's
Landing. My intention was merely to threaten Dalton in front, and
to direct McPherson to act vigorously against the railroad below
Resaca, far to the rear of the enemy. But by reason of his being
short of his estimated strength by the four divisions before
referred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thousand
men, I did not feel justified in placing him so far away from the
support of the main body of the army, and therefore subsequently
changed the plan of campaign, so far as to bring that army up to
Chattanooga, and to direct it thence through Ship's Gap against the
railroad to Johnston's rear, at or near Resaca, distant from Dalton
only eighteen miles, and in full communication with the other
armies by roads behind Rocky face Ridge, of about the same length.