the fort. After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made
by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in
taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed to
disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no
especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was
understood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederate
troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of
property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the
garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at the
mouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from both
Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in
person, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability and
fitness for so important and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It was
here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful
of McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they
could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. It
would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into
such danger. By this time I had received authority to relieve
McClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river
expedition, or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassment
about McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself within
the department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign
a junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the
command myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, to
give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December
before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was