of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up
to two or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side the
highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest
water. Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way,
varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs to
the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no such
highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg
is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high
water--many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be,
except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it
impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length.
Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;
navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical way
according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;
establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses
could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of
railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson,
Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged.
Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The
elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the
prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the
last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater
part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our
ranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement
as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many
of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a
defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the
power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be