announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and moved
promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning