engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our
left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I
naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from
Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.
This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General
Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly
notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and
be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to
do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and
captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few
days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.
Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the
Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,
most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in
North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,
whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more
artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It
occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing
up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,
but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before
leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of
Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and
caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more