concerning his office and authority. Consequently, whatever
the Emperor settles by rescript, or decides in his judicial
capacity, or ordains by edicts, is clearly a statute: and these
are what are called constitutions. Some of these of course
are personal, and not to be followed as precedents, since this
is not the Emperor's will; for a favour bestowed on individual
merit, or a penalty inflicted for individual wrongdoing, or relief
given without a precedent, do not go beyond the particular
person: though others are general, and bind all beyond a doubt.
7 The edicts of the praetors too have no small legal authority,
and these we are used to call the ‘ius honorarium,’ because
those who occupy posts of honour in the state, in other words
the magistrates, have given authority to this branch of law. The
curule aediles also used to issue an edict relating to certain
matters, which forms part of the ius honorarium. 8 The
answers of those learned in the law are the opinions and views
of persons authorized to determine and expound the law; for it
was of old provided that certain persons should publicly inter-
pret the laws, who were called jurisconsults, and whom the
Emperor privileged to give formal answers. If they were
unanimous the judge was forbidden by imperial constitution to
depart from their opinion, so great was its authority. 9 The
unwritten law is that which usage has approved: for ancient
customs, when approved by consent of those who follow them,
are like statute. 10 And this division of the civil law into two
kinds seems not inappropriate, for it appears to have origin-
ated in the institutions of two states, namely Athens and
Lacedaemon; it having been usual in the latter to commit
to memory what was observed as law, while the Athenians
observed only what they had made permanent in written