harboured him.

The fifth factor, the navy, brings us into contact with
world-wide problems of sea-power which are too far-reaching
for discussion here [Footnote: See in this Series The
Winning of Canada and The Passing of New France, where
they are discussed.] Suffice it to say that, while
Louisbourg was an occasional convenience, it had also
peculiar dangers for a squadron from the weaker of two
hostile navies, as squadrons from France were likely to
be. The British could make for a dozen different harbours
on the coast. The French could make for only this one.
Therefore the British had only to guard against this one
stronghold if the French were in superior force; they
could the more easily blockade it if the French were in
equal force; and they could the more easily annihilate
it if it was defended by an inferior force.

The last factor was the fortress itself. This so-called
'Gibraltar of the West,' this 'Quebec by the sea,' this
'Dunkirk of New France,' was certainly first of its kind.
But it was first only in a class of one; while the class
itself was far from being a first among classes. The
natural position was vastly inferior to that of Quebec
or Gibraltar; while the fortifications were not to be
compared with those of Dunkirk, which, in one sense, they
were meant to replace. Dunkirk had been sold by Charles
II to Louis XIV, who made it a formidable naval base
commanding the straits of Dover. When the Treaty of
Utrecht compelled its demolition, the French tried to