While the British had been spending the first four months
of 1745 in preparing 8,000 men, the French authorities
in Louisbourg, whose force was less than 2,000, had been
wasting the same precious time in ridiculous councils of
war. It is a well-known saying that councils of war never
fight. But these Louisbourg councils did not even prepare
to fight. The news from Boston was not heeded. Worse yet,
no attention was paid to the American scouting vessels,
which had been hovering off the coast for more than a
month. The bibulous du Quesnel had died in October. But
his successor, du Chambon, was no better as a commandant.
Perhaps the kindest thing to say of du Chambon is that
he was the foolish father of a knavish son--of that du
Chambon de Vergor who, in the next war, surrendered Fort
Beausejour without a siege and left one sleepy sentry to
watch Wolfe's Cove the night before the Battle of the
Plains.

It is true that du Chambon had succeeded to a thoroughly
bad command. He had no naval force whatever; and the
military force had become worse instead of better. The
mutiny in December had left the 560 regulars in a very
sullen frame of mind. They knew that acquisitive government
officials were cheating them out of their proper rations
of bacon and beans. The officials knew that the soldiers
knew. And so suspicion and resentment grew strong between
them. The only other force was the militia, which, with
certain exceptions, comprised every male inhabitant of
Cape Breton who could stand on two legs and hold a musket
with both hands. There were boys in their early teens