apart from the mind of its maker, and would not regard that mind and
watch as two things, but as matters essentially related. Indeed, these
relations would run wider still, and reason would not rest satisfied
until the watch was united to time itself, to the very framework of
the universe. Apart from this it would be meaningless. In short, if a
man comprehends the watch in a rational way he must comprehend it in
what may he called a conjunct way. The child might picture it as
abstract and single, but it could really be known only in connection
with all that exists. Of course we pause far short of such full
knowledge. Our reason cannot stretch to the infinity of things. But
just so far as relations can be traced between this object and all
other objects, so much the more rational does the knowledge of the
watch become. Rationality is the comprehending of anything in its
relations. The perceptive, isolated view is irrational.

But if this is true of so simple a matter as a watch, it is doubly
true of a complex human being. The child imagines he can comprehend a
person too in isolation, but rational proverb-makers long ago told us,
"One person, no person." Each person must be conceived as tied in with
all his fellows. We have seen how in the case of the watch we were
almost obliged to abandon the thought of a single object and to speak
of it as a kind of centre of constitutive relations. A plexus of ties
runs in every direction, and where these cross there is the watch. So
it is among human beings. If we try for a moment to conceive a person
as single and detached, we shall find he would have no powers to
exercise. No emotions would be his, whether of love or hate, for they
imply objects to arouse them, no occupations of civilized life, for
these involve mutual dependency. From speech he would be cut off, if
there were nobody to speak to; nor would any such instrument as
language be ready for his use, if ancestors had not cooperated in its