indirectly there is moral gain to be had here. One cannot contemplate
long such exalted themes without receiving an impulse, and being
lifted into a region where doing wrong becomes a little strange. When,
too, we reflect how many human ills spring from misunderstanding and
intellectual obscurity, we see that whatever tends to illuminate
mental problems is of large consequence in the practical issues of
life.

In considering what we mean by goodness, we are apt to imagine that
the term applies especially, possibly entirely, to persons. It seems
as if persons alone are entitled to be called good. But a little
reflection shows that this is by no means the case. There are about as
many good things in the world as good persons, and we are obliged to
speak of them about as often. The goodness which we see in things is,
however, far simpler and more easily analyzed than that which appears
in persons. It may accordingly be well in these first two chapters to
say nothing whatever about such goodness as is peculiar to persons,
but to confine our attention to those phases of it which are shared
alike by persons and things.



III

How then do we employ the word "good"? I do not ask how we ought to
employ it, but how we do. For the present we shall be engaged in a
psychological inquiry, not an ethical one. We need to get at the plain
facts of usage. I will therefore ask each reader to look into his own
mind, see on what occasions he uses the word, and decide what meaning
he attaches to it. Taking up a few of the simplest possible examples,