distress or even death. In the last analysis the word good will be
found everywhere to refer to some satisfaction of human desire. If we
count afflictions good, it is because we believe that through them
permanent peace may best be reached. And rightly do those name the
Bible the Good Book who think that it more than any other has helped
to alleviate the woes of man.

With this definition I shall not quarrel. So far as it goes, it seems
to me not incorrect. In all good I too find satisfaction of desire.
Only, though true, the definition is in my judgment vague and
inadequate. For we shall still need some standard to test the goodness
of desires. They themselves may be good, and some of them are better
than others. It is good to eat candy, to love a friend, to hate a foe,
to hear the sound of running water, to practice medicine, to gather
wealth, learning, or postage stamps. But though each of these
represents a natural desire, they cannot all be counted equally good.
They must be tried by some standard other than themselves. For desires
are not detachable facts. Each is significant only as a piece of a
life. In connection with that life it must be judged. And when we ask
if any desire is good or bad, we really inquire how far it may play a
part in company with other desires in making up a harmonious
existence. By its organic quality, accordingly, we must ultimately
determine the goodness of whatever we desire. If it is organic, it
certainly will satisfy desire. But we cannot reverse this statement
and assert that whatever satisfies desire will be organically good. My
own mode of statement is, therefore, clearer and more adequate than
the one here examined, because it brings out fully important
considerations which in this are only implied. Whatever contributes to
the solidity and wealth of an organism is, from the point of view of
that organism, good.