took preposterous risks without the advice of the experts. If Claridge
Pasha had asked the advice of the English Government, or of any of the
Chancellories of Europe, as to his incursions into the Soudan and his
premature attempts at reform, he would have received expert advice that
civilisation had not advanced to that stage in this portion of the world
which would warrant his experiments. It was all very well for one man to
run vast risks and attempt quixotic enterprises, but neither he nor his
countrymen had any right to expect Europe to embroil itself on his
particular account.

At this point he was met by angry cries of dissent, which did not come
from the Opposition alone. His lips set, he would not yield. The
Government could not hold itself responsible for Claridge Pasha's relief,
nor in any sense for his present position. However, from motives of
humanity, it would make representations in the hope that the Egyptian
Government would act; but it was not improbable, in view of past
experiences of Claridge Pasha, that he would extricate himself from his
present position, perhaps had done so already. Sympathy and sentiment
were natural and proper manifestations of human society, but governments
were, of necessity, ruled by sterner considerations. The House must
realise that the Government could not act as though it were wholly a free
agent, or as if its every move would not be matched by another move on
the part of another Power or Powers.

Then followed a brilliant and effective appeal to his own party to
trust the Government, to credit it with feeling and with a due regard
for English prestige and the honour brought to it by Claridge Pasha's
personal qualities, whatever might be thought of his crusading
enterprises. The party must not fall into the trap of playing the game
of the Opposition. Then, with some supercilious praise of the "worthy