Thus the system continued to flourish till the commencement of the
year 1720. The warnings of the Parliament, that too great a creation
of paper money would, sooner or later, bring the country to
bankruptcy, were disregarded. The Regent, who knew nothing whatever of
the philosophy of finance, thought that a system which had produced
such good effects could never be carried to excess. If five hundred
millions of paper had been of such advantage, five hundred millions
additional would be of still greater advantage. This was the grand
error of the Regent, and which Law did not attempt to dispel. The
extraordinary avidity of the people kept up the delusion; and the
higher the price of Indian and Mississippi stock, the more billets de
banque were issued to keep pace with it. The edifice thus reared might
not unaptly be compared to the gorgeous palace erected by Potemkin,
that princely barbarian of Russia, to surprise and please his imperial
mistress: huge blocks of ice were piled one upon another; ionic
pillars, of chastest workmanship, in ice, formed a noble portico; and
a dome, of the same material, shone in the sun, which had just
strength enough to gild, but not to melt it. It glittered afar, like a
palace of crystals and diamonds; but there came one warm breeze from
the south, and the stately building dissolved away, till none were
able even to gather up the fragments. So with Law and his paper
system. No sooner did the breath of popular mistrust blow steadily
upon it, than it fell to ruins, and none could raise it up again.

The first slight alarm that was occasioned was early in 1720. The
Prince de Conti, offended that Law should have denied him fresh shares
in India stock, at his own price, sent to his bank to demand payment
in specie of so enormous a quantity of notes, that three waggons were
required for its transport. Law complained to the Regent, and urged on