parts of it,--in the swelling chest and tightened limbs. Or consider
another case. Suppose I see Franz Hals' "Laughing Cavalier." I feel
jollity in the face, as the cavalier's. Yet in both cases I may feel
the emotions as also my own--as if I too were about to run or were
laughing. And the projection of the idea of the self will occur most
readily if I am myself a runner or a jolly person. In both instances,
moreover, the process will be mediated by impulses to movements that
are the normal accompaniments of the emotions in question. If I observe
myself carefully, I may find that my own chest is tending to swell and
my own limbs to tighten, in imitation of the runner's, or my own pupils
to dilate and the muscles of my face to wrinkle and to part, in
imitation of the Dutchman's. And these movement-impulses I objectify.
I not only see jollity in the face, but laughter as well; in the statue,
not only excitement, but running. And again--where my body is, there
am I; so I am jolly with the cavalier and excited with the runner. The
psychology of this process is simple enough. In my experience there
is a plain connection between the sight of a movement and sensations
attendant upon movement, and further, a connection between some of
these movements, namely, the expressive movements, and the emotions
which they express. In accordance with the law of association by
contiguity, whenever any one of several mental elements usually
connected together is present in the mind, the others tend to arise
also. So here. Seeing the semblance of tight muscles and a smiling
face, I feel the emotions which have these visual associates, experience
the correlated movement-sensations, project them all into the object
which initiated the process.

In recent years, a great deal has been made of these movement-sensations
in explaining aesthetic feeling. [Footnote: See the discussions in Lee
and Thompson: _Beauty and Ugliness_.] Yet in the case of all people who