Here, I think, we find something comparable to the process of
_einfuehlung_. For in art, ideas, like feelings, are objectified
in sensation. Only sensations are given; out of the mind come ideas
through which the former are interpreted and made into the semblance
of things. Consider, for example, Rembrandt's "Night-Watch." A festal
mood is there in the golds and reds, and gloom in the blacks; but there
also are the men and drums and arms. If we wished to push the analogy
with _einfuehlung_, we might coin a corresponding term--_einmeinung_,
"inmeaning." In all the representative arts, this is a process of equal
importance with infeeling; for the artist strives just as much to
realize his ideas of objects in the sense material of his art as to put
his moods there.

When, moreover, we consider that the expression of the more complex
and definite emotions is dependent upon the expression of ideas of
nature and human life, we see that the process is really a single one.
Feeling is a function of ideas; if, then, we demand sincerity in the
one, we must equally demand conviction in the other. The poet could
not convey to us his pleasure at the sight of nature or his awe of
death unless he could somehow bring us into their presence. The painter
could not express the moods of sunlight or of shadow until he had
invented a technique for their representation. Clear and confident
seeing is a condition of feeling. Hence every advance in the imitation
of nature is an advance in the power of expression. The demand for
fidelity of representation, for "truth to nature," so insistently made
by the common man in his criticism of art, is justified even from the
point of view of expressionism.

Yet this fidelity of representation does not involve exact reproduction
of nature. The limitations of the media of the arts definitely exclude