asking; he could hardly go wrong if he heard attentively and weighed
impartially the counsel which they had to offer. Admitting that he would
be all the more efficient for possessing some practical capacity, some
experience of great affairs, was it not probable that a man of average
intelligence, who had been trained from his youth to fill the kingly
office, would acquit himself better than some self-made adventurer of
genius, who had paid more attention to the arts of winning place and
popularity than to the work that would be thrown upon him when he
reached the goal of his ambition? When we further recollect that
hereditary kingship was sanctioned by use and wont, was the most
intelligible symbol of national unity, and possessed as of right all the
prerogatives which were necessary for effective government, it is no
wonder that even those to whom doctrines of popular sovereignty and a
social contract were perfectly familiar acquiesced contentedly in a form
of government which the modern world regards as unreasonable and
essentially precarious.

But a monarchy, however energetic, however public-spirited, was
powerless until based on the firm foundations of an organised executive,
an expert judicature, and an assembly representative in fact if not in
form. No medieval state was so uniformly fortunate as Germany in finding
kings of exceptional character and talent. Yet Germany, from the
beginning to the end of the Middle Ages, was badly governed. This was
not due solely to the circumstance that the German monarchy was in
principle elective. It is true that the German crown was often purchased
by ill-advised concessions; but a greater source of weakness was the
inability of the Emperors to make the most of the prerogatives which
they retained, and which the nation desired that they should exercise.
Imperial justice was dilatory and inefficient because the imperial law
court followed the Emperor; because the professional was liable to be