system had developed to its logical conclusion, if the principles of
feudal government had not been mitigated by revolt from below and
interested tyranny from above, the only possible end would have been a
state of particularism and anarchy compared with which the Germany of
the fifteenth century, or the Italy of the eighteenth, might be called
an earthly paradise.

The very defects of the feudal system are, however, the best proof that
it was the natural and inevitable product of social evolution. A legal
theory so complex, so repugnant to the best traditions both of Roman and
barbarian government, could not have obtained general recognition, as
part of the natural order of things, unless it had grown up by degrees,
unless it had been the outcome of older usages and institutions. A form
of social organisation so cumbrous and so dangerous could hardly have
survived for centuries unless it had solved difficulties of unusual
urgency and magnitude. Let us then consider, in their historical order,
the antecedents of feudalism and the reasons of state by which it was
justified.

Before the downfall of the Roman Empire the duties of local government
were slipping from the grasp of the imperial executive. With or without
official consent, the great proprietors--already held responsible for
the taxes, the military service, and the good conduct of their
dependents--were assuming rights of jurisdiction. When Gaul was
reorganised by the Merovingians, these private courts of law continued
to exist; and they were even legally recognised (by Clotaire II in 614)
as institutions of public utility. A certain number of great estates
were further protected by special charters of privilege
(_immunitas_) which forbade public officials to enter them for the
purposes of making arrests, of holding courts, of collecting fines and