This system is successful because it diminishes soldiering, and this
rests entirely upon the fact that since the workman only receives say
one-third of the increase in pay that he would get under corresponding
conditions on piece work, there is not the same temptation for the
employer to cut prices.

After this system has been in operation for a year or two, if no cuts in
prices have been made, the tendency of the men to soldier on that
portion of the work which is being done under the system is diminished,
although it does not entirely cease. On the other hand, the tendency of
the men to soldier on new work which is started, and on such portions as
are still done on day work, is even greater under the Towne-Halsey plan
than under piece work.

To illustrate: Workmen, like the rest of mankind, are more strongly
influenced by object lessons than by theories. The effect on men of such
an object lesson as the following will be apparent. Suppose that two
men, named respectively Smart and Honest, are at work by the day and
receive the same pay, say 20 cents per hour. Each of these men is given
a new piece of work which could be done in one hour. Smart does his job
in four hours (and it is by no means unusual for men to soldier to this
extent). Honest does his in one and one-half hours.

Now, when these two jobs start on this basis under the Towne-Halsey plan
and are ultimately done in one hour each, Smart receives for his job 20
cents per hour + a premium of 20 cents = a total of 40 cents. Honest
receives for his job 20 cents per hour + a premium of 3 1/8 cents = a
total of 23 1/8 cents.