(as I have elsewhere stated) want Sikkim and Bhotan too, and we had
undertaken the protection of the former country, mainly to keep the
Nepalese out of it.] taking the opportunity to attack us. With the
latter we were in profound peace, and we had a resident at their
court; and I have elsewhere shown the impossibility of a Tibet
invasion, even if the Chinese or Lhassan authorities were inclined to
interfere in the affairs of Sikkim, which they long ago formally
declined doing in the case of aggressions of the Nepalese and
Bhotanese, the Sikkim Rajah being under British protection.* [The
general officer considered that our troops would have been cut to
pieces if they entered the country; and the late General Sir Charles
Napier has since given evidence to the same effect. Having been
officially asked at the time whether I would guide a party into the
country, and having drawn up (at the request of the general officer)
plans for the purpose, and having given it as my opinion that it
would not only have been feasible but easy to have marched a force in
peace and safety to Tumloong, I feel it incumbent on me here to
remark, that I think General Napier, who never was in Sikkim, and
wrote from many hundred miles' distance, must have misapprehended the
state of the case. Whether an invasion of Sikkim was either advisable
or called for, was a matter in which I had no concern: nor do I offer
an opinion as to the impregnability of the country if it were
defended by natives otherwise a match for a British force, and having
the advantage of position. I was not consulted with reference to any
difference of opinion between the civil and military powers, such as
seems to have called for the expression of Sir Charles Napier's
opinion on this matter, and which appears to be considerably
overrated in his evidence.

The general officer honoured me with his friendship at Dorjiling, and