objects. At all events, the propertied classes, in the main, secured
what they wanted. And, as fast as their interests changed, so did the
acts and dicta of Government change.

While the political economists were busy promulgating the doctrine
that it was not the province of Government to embark in any
enterprise other than that of purely governing--a doctrine precisely
suiting the traders and borrowed from their demands--the commercial
classes, early in the nineteenth century, suddenly discovered that
there was an exception. They wanted canals built; and as they had not
sufficient funds for the purpose, and did not see any immediate
profit for themselves, they clamored for the building of them by the
States. In fine, they found that it was to their interest to have the
States put through canal projects on the ground that these would
"stimulate trade." The canals were built, but the commercial classes
in some instances made the blunder of allowing the ownership to rest
in the people.

Never again was this mistake repeated. If it proved so easy to get
legislatures and Congress to appropriate millions of the public funds
for undertakings profitable to commerce, why would it not be equally
simple to secure the appropriation plus the perpetual title? Why be
satisfied with one portion, when the whole was within reach?

True, the popular vote was to be reckoned with; it was a time when
the people scanned the tax levy with far greater scrutiny than now;
and they were not disposed to put up the public funds only that
private individuals might reap the exclusive benefit. But there was a
way of tricking and circumventing the electorate. The trading and
land-owning classes knew its effectiveness. It was they who had