the abstract quality, or qualities, the possession of which it
implies. We cannot, for instance, predicate the term 'learned' of the
abstract quality of learning: but we may predicate it of the
individuals, Varro and Vergil. Attributives, then, are to be regarded
as names, not of the attributes which they imply, but of the things in
which those attributes are found.

92. Attributives, however, are names of things in a less direct way
than that in which subject-terms may be the names of the same
things. Attributives are names of things only in predication, whereas
subject-terms are names of things in or out of predication. The terms
'horse' and 'Bucephalus' are names of certain things, in this case
animals, whether we make any statement about them or not: but the
terms 'swift' and 'fiery' only become names of the same things in
virtue of being predicable of them. When we say 'Horses are swift' or
'Bucephalus was fiery,' the terms 'swift' and 'fiery' become names
respectively of the same things as 'horse' and 'Bucephalus.' This
function of attributives as names in a secondary sense is exactly
expressed by the grammatical term 'noun adjective.' An attributive is
not directly the name of anything. It is a name added on in virtue of
the possession by a given thing of a certain attribute, or, in some
cases, the non-possession.

93. Although attributives cannot be used as subjects, there is
nothing to prevent a subject-term from being used as a predicate, and
so assuming for the time being the functions of an attributive. When
we say 'Socrates was a man,' we convey to the mind the idea of the
same attributes which are implied by the attributive 'human.' But
those terms only are called attributives which can never be used
except as predicates.