from one another, is connotative.

156. A term which possesses no intension (if that be possible) or in
which extension and intension coincide is non-connotative.

157. The subject-term, 'man,' and its corresponding attributive,
'human,' have both extension and intension, distinct from one
another. They are therefore connotative. But the abstract term,
'humanity,' denotes the very collection of attributes, which was
before connoted by the concrete terms, 'man' and 'human.' In this
case, therefore, extension and intension coincide, and the term is
non-connotative.

158. The above remark must be understood to be limited to abstract
terms in their singular sense. When employed as common terms, abstract
terms possess both extension and intension distinct from one
another. Thus the term 'colour' applies to red, blue, and yellow, and
at the same time implies (i.e. connotes), the power of affecting the
eye.

159. Since all terms are names of things, whether substances or
attributes, it is clear that all terms must possess extension, though
the extension of singular terms is the narrowest possible, as being
confined to one thing.

160. Are there then any terms which possess no intension? To ask
this, is to ask--Are there any terms which have absolutely no meaning?
It is often said that proper names are devoid of meaning, and the
remark is, in a certain sense, true. When we call a being by the name
'man,' we do so because that being possesses human attributes, but