well as copula, as when we say 'God is,' which may be analysed, if we
please, into 'God is existent.'

190. We have laid down above that there are two kinds of copula,
affirmative and negative: but some logicians have maintained that the
copula is always affirmative.

191. What then, it may be asked, on this view, is the meaning of
negative propositions! To which the answer is, that a negative
proposition asserts an agreement between the subject and a negative
term. When, for instance, we say 'The whale is not a fish,' this would
be interpreted to mean 'The whale is a not-fish.'

192. Undoubtedly any negative proposition may be exhibited in an
affirmative form, since, by the law of excluded middle, given a pair
of contradictory terms, wherever the one can be asserted, the other
can be denied, and vice versa. We shall find later on that this
principle gives rise to one of the forms of immediate inference. The
only question then can be, which is the more natural and legitimate
form of expression. It seems simpler to suppose that we assert the
agreement of 'whale' with 'not-fish' by implication only, and that
what we directly do is to predicate a disagreement between 'whale' and
the positive attributes connoted by 'fish.' For since 'not-fish' must
apply to every conceivable object of thought except those which fall
under the positive term 'fish,' to say that a whale is a 'not-fish,'
is to say that we have still to search for 'whale' throughout the
whole universe of being, minus a limited portion; which is only a more
clumsy way of saying that it is not to be found in that portion.

193. Again, the term 'not-fish' must be understood either in its