of it, that she may fix them more intently on the other?

So long as the physiologist is content to be a physicist, and nothing
more--using the word "physicist" in its widest signification--his
position in regard to the organic world is one of extreme but
legitimate one-sidedness. As the crystal to the mineralogist or the
vibrating string to the acoustician, so from this point of view both
man and the lower animals are to the physiologist neither more nor
less than the matter of which they consist. That animals feel desire
and repugnance, that the material mechanism of the human frame is in
chose connection with emotions of pleasure or pain, and with the
active idea-life of consciousness--this cannot, in the eyes of the
physicist, make the animal or human body into anything more than what
it actually is. To him it is a combination of matter, subjected to
the same inflexible laws as stones and plants--a material
combination, the outward and inward movements of which interact as
cause and effect, and are in as close connection with each other and
with their surroundings as the working of a machine with the
revolutions of the wheels that compose it.

Neither sensation, nor idea, nor yet conscious will, can form a link
in this chain of material occurrences which make up the physical life
of an organism. If I am asked a question and reply to it, the
material process which the nerve fibre conveys from the organ of
hearing to the brain must travel through my brain as an actual and
material process before it can reach the nerves which will act upon
my organs of speech. It cannot, on reaching a given place in the
brain, change then and there into an immaterial something, and turn
up again some time afterwards in another part of the brain as a
material process. The traveller in the desert might as well hope,