alike; so again are their capabilities and the outcomes of their
conscious intelligence--though this, indeed, is not the case with
man, nor in some measure even with the highest animals; and it is
through this want of uniformity that there is such a thing as
individuality. The external conditions of all the individuals of a
species are also tolerably similar, and when they differ essentially,
the instincts are likewise different--a fact in support of which no
examples are necessary. From like conditions of mind and body (and
this includes like predispositions of brain and ganglia) and like
exterior circumstances, like desires will follow as a necessary
logical consequence. Again, from like desires and like inward and
outward circumstances, a like choice of means--that is to say, like
instincts--must ensue. These last two steps would not be conceded
without restriction if the question were one involving conscious
deliberation, but as these logical consequences are supposed to
follow from the unconscious, which takes the right step unfailingly
without vacillation or delay so long as the premises are similar, the
ensuing desires and the instincts to adopt the means for their
gratification will be similar also.

Thus the view which we have taken concerning instinct explains the
very last point which it may be thought worth while to bring forward
in support of the opinions of our opponents.

I will conclude this chapter with the words of Schelling:
"Thoughtful minds will hold the phenomena of animal instinct to
belong to the most important of all phenomena, and to be the true
touchstone of a durable philosophy."