Von Hartmann speaks of "a mechanism of brain or mind" contrived by
nature, and again of "a psychical organisation," as though it were
something distinct from a physical organisation.

We can conceive of such a thing as mechanism of brain, for we have
seen brain and handled it; but until we have seen a mind and handled
it, or at any rate been enabled to draw inferences which will warrant
us in conceiving of it as a material substance apart from bodily
substance, we cannot infer that it has an organisation apart from
bodily organisation. Does Von Hartmann mean that we have two bodies-
-a body-body, and a soul-body?


He says that no one will call the action of the spider instinctive in
voiding the fluids from its glands when they are too full. Why not?


He is continually personifying instinct; thus he speaks of the "ends
proposed to itself by the instinct," of "the blind unconscious
purpose of the instinct," of "an unconscious purpose constraining the
volition of the bird," of "each variation and modification of the
instinct," as though instinct, purpose, and, later on, clairvoyance,
were persons, and not words characterising a certain class of
actions. The ends are proposed to itself by the animal, not by the
instinct. Nothing but mischief can come of a mode of expression
which does not keep this clearly in view.


It must not be supposed that the same cuckoo is in the habit of