not the organic expression of discontent which has been long felt,
but which has not been attended to, nor been met step by step by as
much small remedial modification as was found practicable: so that
when a change does come it comes by way of revolution. Or, again
(only that it comes to much the same thing), it may be compared to
one of those happy thoughts which sometimes come to us unbidden after
we have been thinking for a long time what to do, or how to arrange
our ideas, and have yet been unable to come to any conclusion" (pp.
14, 15). {0g}

We come to another order of mind in Hans Driesch. At the time he
began his work biologists were largely busy in a region indicated by
Darwin, and roughly mapped out by Haeckel--that of phylogeny. From
the facts of development of the individual, from the comparison of
fossils in successive strata, they set to work at the construction of
pedigrees, and strove to bring into line the principles of
classification with the more or less hypothetical "stemtrees."
Driesch considered this futile, since we never could reconstruct from
such evidence anything certain in the history of the past. He
therefore asserted that a more complete knowledge of the physics and
chemistry of the organic world might give a scientific explanation of
the phenomena, and maintained that the proper work of the biologist
was to deepen our knowledge in these respects. He embodied his
views, seeking the explanation on this track, filling up gaps and
tracing projected roads along lines of probable truth in his
"Analytische Theorie der organische Entwicklung." But his own work
convinced him of the hopelessness of the task he had undertaken, and
he has become as strenuous a vitalist as Butler. The most complete
statement of his present views is to be found in "The Philosophy of
Life" (1908-9), being the Giffold Lectures for 1907-8. Herein he