circulation which should build it up, in his own words, into a capital, or
national heart, if not "as large as London, yet of a magnitude inferior to
few others in Europe." [Footnote: Washington to Mrs. Fairfax, 16 May,
1798; Sparks, xi, 233.] Maryland and Virginia abounded, as Washington well
knew, in coal and iron. His canal passing through this region would
stimulate industry, and these States would thus become the focus of
exchanges. Manufacturing is incompatible with slavery, hence slavery would
gradually and peacefully disappear, and the extremities of the Union would
be drawn together at what he described as "the great emporium of the
United States." To crown all, a national university was to make this
emporium powerful in collective thought.

Doubtless Grenville and Townshend had not considered the American problem
as maturely as had Washington, but nevertheless, most well-informed
persons now agree that Englishmen in 1763 were quite alive to the
advantages which would accrue to Great Britain, by holding in absolute
control a rich but incoherent body of colonies whose administrative centre
lay in England, and were as anxious that London should serve as the heart
of America as Washington was that America should have its heart on the
Potomac.

Accordingly, England attempted to isolate Massachusetts and pressed an
attack on her with energy, before the whole thirteen colonies should be
able to draw to a unity. On the other hand, Washington, and most sensible
Americans, resisted this attack as resolutely as might be under such
disadvantages, not wishing for independence, but hoping for some
compromise like that which Great Britain has since effected with her
remaining colonies. The situation, however, admitted of no peaceful
adjustment, chiefly because the imbecility of American administration
induced by her incapacity for collective thought, was so manifest, that