The first argument (he says) of the Duke's adversaries, "is founded on
the regard which ought to be paid to justice, and on the good effects
which, they affirm, such an example would have, in suppressing the
ambition of any future minister. But if I can prove that his ---- might
be made a much greater example of by being suffered to live, I think I
may, without vanity, affirm that their whole argument will fall to the
ground. By pursuing the methods which they propose, viz. chopping off
his ----'s head, I allow the impression would be stronger at first; but
we should consider how soon that wears off. If, indeed, his ----'s
crimes were of such a nature, as to entitle his head to a place on
Temple-Bar, I should allow some weight to their argument. But, in the
present case, we should reflect how apt mankind are to relent after they
have inflicted punishment;--so that, perhaps, the same men who would
have detested the noble Lord, while alive and in prosperity, pointing
him as a scarecrow to their children, might, after being witnesses to
the miserable fate that had overtaken him, begin in their hearts to pity
him; and from the fickleness so common to human nature, perhaps, by way
of compensation, acquit him of part of his crimes; insinuate that he was
dealt hardly with, and thus, by the remembrance of their compassion, on
this occasion, be led to show more indulgence to any future offender in
the same circumstances." There is a clearness of thought and style here
very remarkable in so young a writer.

In affecting to defend the Duke against the charge of fickleness and
unpunctuality, he says, "I think I could bring several instances which
should seem to promise the greatest steadiness and resolution. I have
known him make the Council wait, on the business of the whole nation,
when he has had an appointment to Newmarket. Surely, this is an instance
of the greatest honor; and, if we see him so punctual in private