they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon
which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that
a man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so,
men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the
descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in
war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that such persons
should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they
say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature,
which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that there
are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves,
but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble
descent: it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as
such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account
at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one
universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the
immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they
distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from
each other by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it
reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a
good man, a good man should be descended; and this is what nature
desires to do, but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then
that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these persons are not
slaves, and those freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that
in some instances it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to
both parties for this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and
that it is right and just, that some should be governed, and others