too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a
single person, a city than a family; and indeed Plato supposes that a
city owes its existence to that sufficiency in themselves which the
members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is so desirable, the
less the city is one the better.




CHAPTER III


But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as
much as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place
by permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine
(though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is
entirely one), for the word All is used in two senses; if it means
each individual, what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for
each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his
own property, and of everything else that may happen to belong to him,
that it is his own. But those who have their wives and children in
common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as
individuals; therefore, to use the word all is evidently a fallacious
mode of speech; for this word is sometimes used distributively, and
sometimes collectively, on account of its double meaning, and is the
cause of inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all
persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word all in its
distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: in its
collective sense it would by no means contribute to the concord of the
state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience attending this